Abstract-We consider a number of 'honest' mobile agents which are initially scattered in an asynchronous network. In the network there is also a hostile mobile agent that is able to block the agents' movements. The honest agents need to meet (rendezvous) at a node. We study this problem under a weakest scenario in which the agents do not have any information about the size of the network or their number, they do not have distinct identities, they cannot see or communicate with eachother unless they are at the same node, and they only have constant memory. We give a universal distributed deterministic algorithm that solves the problem for any number of more than two honest agents in oriented rings, and for any odd number of agents in unoriented rings, despite the existence of a malicious agent. We prove that the problem is unsolvable in any other configuration in a ring network. Then, we study the problem in an oriented mesh network and we prove that the problem can be solved if and only if the honest agents initially form a connected configuration without holes and they can see at a distance two. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study such a weak setting with a malicious agent in which the aim of the honest agents is to achieve a task in the 'trusted' subnetwork, i.e., in the part of the network where the malicious agent has no access.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important issue in distributed mobile computing, is the feasibility of a task which has been assigned to a team of mobile agents when there is a malicious entity in the network. This hostile entity may be stationary or mobile and may harm the hosts and the mobile agents. Methods for protecting mobile agents from malicious nodes have been proposed mainly based on the identification of the malicious host. Although some methods for dealing with malicious agents have been proposed, the issue of protecting a network (hosts and mobile agents) from malicious agents is still wide open (see, e.g., [1] and references therein).
A model for harmful nodes which has been extensively studied is the black hole, where a node which contains a stationary process destroys all mobile agents upon visiting it, without leaving any trace. In the Black Hole Search problem the goal for the agents is to locate the black hole within finite time. Many solutions for the problem have been proposed both for the asynchronous and synchronous setting Work partially supported by the PRIN 2010 Project Security Horizons. using various communication mechanisms employed by the agents, see, e.g., [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] .
Apart from the black hole behaviour (i.e., killing every visiting agent without leaving any trace), a host may have many other ways to harm the mobile agents: it may select when to harm a visiting agent (i.e., it may sometimes act as a safe node), it may also duplicate agents, introduce fake agents, tamper the runtime environment (e.g., changing the information stored at the node), or disobey communication protocols (e.g., not execute agents in FIFO order). A model for hostile nodes which has those capabilities has been presented in [9] , [10] , where the authors have studied how a more severe (than a black hole) behaviour of a malicious host affects the solvability of the Periodic Data Retrieval problem in asynchronous networks. In this problem the agents are required to visit every safe node of the network infinitely many times.
Another case of a harmful entity that has been considered in the literature is a mobile entity which acts as a virus that infects any visited network site. Thus, a team of mobile agents has the task to decontaminate the infected sites and prevent any reinfection of cleaned areas. This problem is equivalent to the one of capturing an invisible intruder moving in the network. For results on this and related problems see, e.g., [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] .
An important problem that has been studied in the presence of malicious nodes is the Rendezvous problem. In this problem two or more mobile agents are said to rendezvous if they occupy the same node of the network at the same time. Execution of more complicated tasks often requires the coordination of the mobile agents in order to share information, divide up duties, etc., hence solving the rendezvous problem is important. Finding deterministic algorithms for Rendezvous in weak models is far from trivial and often the problem is unsolvable even without the presence of malicious nodes. Depending on memory capabilities and knowledge of the mobile agents, the Rendezvous problem can be easily solved even in the asynchronous case in safe networks that have an asymmetry (e.g., a distinguished node), and can be explored by the agents, since the mobile agents can simply be instructed to meet at such a distinguished node. However, this is not the case for networks without asymmetries, or when the agents cannot visit all nodes of the network, and the rendezvous problem in such settings is non-trivial and not always solvable even in simple topologies such as the ring network. Symmetry in the Rendezvous problem can be broken by attaching unique identifiers to the agents (see, e.g., [17] , [18] ), or in anonymous networks using other deterministic techniques, as in e.g., [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , or randomized algorithms [23] .
With respect to hostile environments, the Rendezvous problem has been studied when there is a black hole or other stationary faults in the network [24] , [25] , [26] , however nothing is known about the solvability of the problem in the presence of hostile agents.
Our Results: In this paper we model a hostile entity which is mobile. It is not harmful to the other mobile agents but can prevent them from visiting a node: a honest mobile agent cannot visit a node which is occupied by a malicious agent. This problem can be rephrased as follows: the hostile entity represents a virus that may spread around the network. While in the classical decontamination problem the aim is to extinguish the virus, in our setting the virus cannot be extinguished and has to be isolated thus dividing the network in unstrusted and trusted subnetworks. We can imagine the untrusted subnetwork as a botnet which can be controlled by the botmaster (the malicious entity). A honest agent that resides on a node protects the trusted network from the untrusted one by running some protection mechanism (e.g., a firewall, an intrusion detection mechanism, etc.). On the other hand the botnet is dynamic, and it may reduce its dimension (i.e., the botmaster leaves the host) or it may increase it only on hosts not occupied, i.e., protected by an agent. Honest agents may expand towards the untrusted hosts which are not controlled by the botmaster anymore by running botnet detection mechanisms (see, e.g., [27] ). We are then interested in solving the rendezvous problem in the trusted subnetwork, and we want to study how this malicious behaviour affects the solvability of the Rendezvous problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we first give some necessary conditions for the solvability of the problem which lead us to impossibility results and properties that must be respected by any correct algorithm for the problem.
In Section III we consider ring topologies and we design a universal deterministic algorithm that solves the Rendezvous problem, despite the existence of a malicious agent, for any number of at least three honest agents with constant memory in oriented rings, and for any odd number of agents in unoriented rings. We prove that the problem is unsolvable for two agents in oriented rings and for any even number of agents in unoriented rings, which makes our algorithm optimal in the considered model.
In Section IV we consider oriented mesh topologies and we prove that the problem can be solved by a deterministic algorithm for any number of agents with constant memory if and only if the agents initially form a connected configuration without holes and they can detect which are the occupied nodes within a distance of two hops.
Due to space limitation, some proofs and figures have been moved to an Appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we first formally define our model. Then we give necessary conditions for the solvability of the problem and show some impossibility results.
A. Our Model
We represent the network by a graph G = (V, E) composed by |V | = n anonymous nodes or hosts and |E| edges or connections between nodes. Each host is connected to other hosts by bidirectional asynchronous FIFO links, and it is capable of serving agents by a mutual exclusive mechanism. The links incident to a host are distinctlabeled but this port labelling is not globally consistent. In the network there are some mobile agents which are independent computational processes with some constant internal memory. The agents are initially scattered in the network, and can move along its edges. We assume there are k honest anonymous identical agents A 1 , A 2 , . . . A k , and one malicious agent M which may deviate from the proper operations. We describe below the capabilities and behaviour of honest and malicious agents.
Honest agents:
A honest agent located at a node u can see all other agents at u (if any), and can also read their states. The agents are anonymous, cannot exchange messages and cannot leave messages at nodes. They are identical finite state automata, hence they have some constant memory (independent of the size n of the network). They neither know n nor their number k. Two agents travelling on the same edge at different directions do not notice each-other. Their goal is to rendezvous at a node.
Malicious agent:
We consider a worst case scenario in which the malicious agent M is a very powerful entity compared to honest agents: It can move arbitrarily fast inside the network and can permanently 'see' the positions of all the other agents. It has unlimited memory and knows the transition function of the honest agents. When it resides at a node u it prevents any adjacent honest agent H from visiting u: agent H receives a signal that M is in u (botnet detection) and we say that H meets M . The malicious agent can neither visit a node which is already occupied by some honest agent, nor cross some honest agent in a link. It also obeys the FIFO property of the links (i.e., it cannot overpass a honest agent which is moving on a link).
We notice here that some of our impossibility results hold even for stronger models, e.g., when honest agents have unlimited memory, distinct identities, knowledge about the size of the network, visibility, etc. Our algorithms only require that honest agents use the minimal resources mentioned above while for the mesh topology they also have the ability to scan nodes within a constant distance.
Throughout the paper, unless explicitly mentioned, we call a node u occupied (respectively, free or unoccupied) when one or more (no) honest agents are in u. We say that the malicious agent M covers a connected area of unoccupied nodes meaning that M can move very fast in that area preventing any honest agent from reaching any node in the area 1 .
B. Basic Properties
We show below some impossibility results and necessary conditions for the solvability of the problem. We start by defining a property which could be satisfied by a configuration of agents placed in a graph.
Property 1. Consider a configuration of honest agents in a graph G and let H
f be the subgraph of G induced by all free nodes in the current configuration.
• There is a vertex cut-set F ⊆ V (H f ) composed of free nodes which disconnects G so that not all occupied nodes are in the same connected component and,
Intuitively, Property 1 says that there is a connected subgraph of G induced by free nodes in the configuration which contains a set of nodes whose removal would disconnect graph G so that not all occupied nodes are in the same connected component (i.e., the subgraph H o , which is induced by all occupied nodes, is not connected). We now prove that in graphs with a malicious agent where the initial configuration satisfies Property 1 rendezvous is impossible. 
PROOF Let H
f be the subgraph of G induced by all free nodes of C 0 and let V M ⊆ V (H f ) and F ⊆ V M be the sets of free nodes as defined in Property 1. Let u, v be two occupied nodes which are in different connected components of G and let A, B be the honest agents located at u, v respectively. Due to asynchronicity an adversary can introduce delays to A's and B's movements while at the same time the malicious agent, which has been initially placed at a node in V M , can move everywhere in V M , since V M has only free nodes and the subgraph induced by all nodes in V M is connected. Hence the malicious agent can move fast everywhere in F (since F ⊆ V M ), thus preventing agents A, B, from visiting any node in F . Since all paths between u and v pass from nodes of F , agents A, B can never meet, no matter how powerful they are.
We now define a necessary condition for any correct algorithm for the problem. 
Corollary 1. Let
PROOF The malicious agent can be initially placed at x 0 and at time t Intuitively, Corollary 1 says that if an algorithm A creates a configuration C t at a time t in which Property 1 holds, and in C t there is a node x ∈ V M t so that either: i) x was always free or, ii) there are paths of nodes which eventually become free and they form a connection between a free node at C 0 and x, then algorithm A cannot be correct.
Hence, any correct algorithm for the solution of the problem should avoid a situation like the one described in Corollary 1. Notice that Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 hold due to a configuration for which Property 1 holds, the presence of a malicious host, and the asynchronicity of the network, and this is independent from the power of the honest agents. Observe now that if Property 1 does not hold for a configuration C in some graph G, then the following property should hold: Therefore, a natural question is whether rendezvous is always solvable in a graph G for an initial configuration C where Property 2 holds. As we show below, this is not true in many different graph topologies and initial configurations, even when the agents have more capabilities, like for example distinct identities, unlimited memory, etc.
Lemma 2. Property 2 is not sufficient for the solvability of rendezvous in a graph with a malicious agent.
PROOF Consider a graph G for which there is a non-empty set C P of initial configurations where Property 2 holds, and a non-empty set CP of initial configurations where Property 2 does not hold. Let C ∈ C P be an initial configuration where H f and H o are the subgraphs of G induced by all free nodes and all occupied nodes of G, respectively.
Case 1: Suppose that subgraph H o is connected and therefore Property 2.1 holds. Suppose also that there exists a vertex cut-set Q of H o (composed of occupied nodes, that are denoted by circled nodes in Figure 1 left) which is connected, and there is a node in Q which is adjacent to a free node a in graph G. Suppose that H f is also connected. The vertex cut-set Q splits H o into two connected subgraphs H o 1 and H o 2 . Any correct algorithm for the solution of the rendezvous problem should avoid moving first the agents from all the nodes of Q since in that case Property 1 will hold, and assuming there is a malicious agent at node a, Corollary 1 would apply. However, due to the asynchronicity of the agents' movements and the limited capabilities of the agents, an algorithm cannot guarantee that at least one agent remains at a node of Q as long as there are agents in both H o 1 and H o 2 . Even if the agents have unlimited memory and distinct identities they cannot avoid the situation described; they really need to have some information about their configuration.
Case 2: Consider now the initial configuration C ∈ C P in the graph G of Figure 1 right for which H o is disconnected. Suppose that every subgraph of H f that contains a vertex cut-set F which disconnects G leaving occupied nodes in different connected components, is disconnected (i.e., Property 2.2 holds). This means that the subgraph H o contains a vertex cut-set which disconnects G so that every subgraph of H f that contains F is disconnected. The agents are in the circled nodes of Figure 1 right, and the malicious agent is in node m. One of the connected components of H f includes node m and the other one includes nodes x, y. If any agent moves, then the new subgraph of occupied nodes remains disconnected, but the new subgraph of free nodes becomes connected, thus Property 1 holds and Corollary 1 applies. Hence no matter how much power or capabilities the agents have (even if they can see the configuration at all times), rendezvous is impossible.
III. RENDEZVOUS IN A RING NETWORK
In this section we will study the rendezvous problem in rings with a malicious agent M . We assume that the ring is bidirectional, the n hosts are anonymous, and there are k honest agents which neither know k, nor n. In a scenario like this, rendezvous is impossible even when there is no malicious agent, the ring is oriented, the agents have unlimited memory and they know k, since an adversary can keep synchronized the agents so that they always take the same actions at the same time. Thus, in order to solve the problem we need to add something to the model. We therefore assume that there is a special node labeled o * in the graph. We now present some impossibility results, and we give a universal algorithm that handles all solvable cases.
A. Impossibility Results

Lemma 3.
There is no universal algorithm for k = 2 honest agents and one malicious agent which enables the honest agents to rendezvous in any bidirectional oriented anonymous ring with a special node o * , even if they know k and have unlimited memory. PROOF In order for the two honest agents to rendezvous, at least one of them should eventually stop at a node since otherwise, due to asynchronicity, an adversary can always delay one of the agents so that both agents never occupy the same node at the same time. Hence any potentially correct algorithm should eventually instruct an agent to stop at a node. Suppose there is an algorithm A which solves the problem. Clearly, algorithm A should start by moving the two agents. Initially, the instructions and the inputs are the same for both of them, thus the adversary may synchronize them so that they will move towards the same direction (clockwise or counter-clockwise) and maintain their initial distance, until one of them meets the special node o * or the malicious agent M . Clearly, if the algorithm instructs them to stop before meeting o * or M , they will stop at different nodes and will never rendezvous.
It is easy to see that if algorithm A instructs the agents to stop only after they have met M (respectively, o * ) a fixed number of times, and possibly moved for a fixed number of steps, then A cannot be correct, since M could move synchronously with the agents (respectively, could cover node o * ) and therefore the agents will never meet M (respectively, visit node o * ). Hence a decision to stop should be taken by an agent some (fixed) time after either meeting M or reaching node o * . Suppose that the algorithm instructs an agent to stop after either it has met M for a fixed number of times b M + 1, or after it has reached node o * for a fixed number of times p o * + b o * + 1, where p o * is the number of times that an agent passes through node o * without changing direction and b o * (respectively b M ) is the number of times that an agent met node o * (respectively, M ) and changed direction (bumped). We will now show that M can always arrange its initial placement and its moves so that eventually one of the agents will stop at a node u some fixed time after meeting M , while the other will stop at a node v = u some (fixed) time after meeting M or visiting node o * .
• Case 1: Figure 6 (b) in the Appendix). Given that both A and B have to stop after meeting M for b M +1 = 1 times, and since they are moving in opposite directions, they will stop at different nodes. Case 2.2: If b o * = 0, M moves synchronously with the two agents until a time step t at which the first agent, say A, meets node o * for the (p o * + 1)-th time and stops. Up to time t, the agents were moving in the same direction (clockwise or counter-clockwise) having maintained their initial distance. The malicious agent M (which had placed itself after agent A and before agent B on the direction in which B was moving at time t) stops at a node u adjacent to o * . Hence B will stop at a node v, which is located a fixed number of steps before o * (see Figure 6 (c) in the Appendix). Thus A and B will stop at different nodes.
In all cases the agents stop at different nodes, thus algorithm A cannot be correct. For unoriented rings the following lemma holds. PROOF Consider the following initial configuration fixed by an adversary: M covers some nodes including node o * , and leaves k + 2 nodes uncovered (see Figure 2) . The honest agents are initially placed in k consecutive nodes and the two extreme occupied nodes are at distance 2 from the area patrolled by M (i.e., the one in the top between m and m ′ , and excluding them). The adversary splits the chain into two subchains of consecutive occupied nodes of equal length and forces any two agents to have a different orientation of the ring if and only if they belong to different subchains. The configuration is symmetric with an axis of symmetry crossing the chain of agents in the middle.
Suppose there is an algorithm A which solves the problem. As in the proof of Lemma 3, algorithm A should eventually instruct at least one of the agents to stop at a node since otherwise, due to asynchronicity, an adversary can always introduce delays to the agents so that any two agents never occupy the same node at the same time.
The adversary synchronizes (and also introduces suitable delays to) the agents and selects their orientation as clockwise so that each subchain of agents moves towards the direction closest to M . It is easy to see that the adversary can synchronize the agents so that any two symmetric agents which initially belong to different subchains, at any given time have the same input: They always arrive at symmetric nodes through the same (perceived) direction, and these nodes are either unoccupied, occupied by the same number of agents, or adjacent to M . Hence the configuration remains symmetric at every time step and any two symmetric agents belonging to different subchains will never occupy the same node at the same time. Table I ALGORITHM RV-RING.
B. A Universal Algorithm for Rendezvous in the Ring
In this section we present a universal algorithm, called Algorithm RV-RING, that solves the problem for any number of more than two agents in oriented rings and for an odd number of agents in unoriented rings. Intuitively the algorithm works as follows: The agents move until they meet the special node 2 o * or the malicious agent M . If an agent A meets another agent that stopped at o * , then it keeps moving until it meets the malicious agent M or another agent that stopped (not at o * ). If A meets M at an unoccupied node 2 If there are at least two agents having a different orientation for the ring, then (as it is proved in Lemma 5), no agent will stop at node o * . m then it stops. If A meets at least two agents, then again stops. If A meets exactly one agent B at a different state than stopper then it stops, otherwise (i.e., if B is a stopper) agent A changes direction and moves until it meets M again. Then it changes again direction and moves to m collecting everyone on the way 3 . The algorithm is illustrated in Table I . Note that for a ring network with one malicious agent, Property 1 does not hold for any configuration of the agents.
Below we give two examples of configurations of three agents executing the algorithm. 
Example 1. Consider an oriented ring with three agents as in Figure 3 left. Agent A is the first agent that bumps into the malicious agent M (Case 0.2) at node x, thus it becomes a stopper and waits. Agent B arrives at x, finds A (Case 0.3.1) and becomes a transformer-1. Agent
PROOF
Case 1:
Let us first prove the correctness of the algorithm when the agents agree on the ring's orientation. Let A be the first agent which exits the initial state (either by meeting node o * for the third time, or by meeting M ).
• Suppose that A meets node o * (for the third time) and therefore A becomes a stopper (see Figure 7 .1a in the Appendix). Consider the next agent B which exits the initial state. Agent B should meet M . Let m be the node where B meets M , and hence it becomes a stopper. Then let C be the next agent that exits the initial state. Agent C should meet agent B (notice that if C passes from the special node o * will not stop to meet agent A). Thus C passes from cases (0.3.1) → (1) → (2.2) → (4) → (7) of the Algorithm RV-RING, collecting agent A and ending at node m. Meanwhile, all other agents (if any) gather at node m, since they pass from cases (0.3.2) and then possibly (3.1), or (0.3.3) and (6), all of them ending at state final except possibly one which is at state stopper. Hence, when agent C arrives at m, all the agents change to state terminator and exit.
• Suppose that A meets M at a node m. Consider the next agent B which exits the initial state. If B meets node o * then we can argue similarly as in the previous paragraph by replacing agent A there with B. If B meets A, then we can again argue as in the previous paragraph by replacing agents B and C there with A and B respectively. Case 2: Now let us prove the correctness of the algorithm when the number of the agents is odd and they do not agree on the ring's orientation (since if they agree it has been already covered before). We first observe that if there are at least two agents X and Y having a different orientation for the ring, then no agent will exit the initial state by stopping at the special node o * . Indeed, let C X and C Y be the subsets of agents having the same orientation for the ring as agents X and Y , respectively. Due to the presence of the malicious agent M in the ring (and the fact that M can not overtake or pass by a honest agent), an agent from C X (or C Y ) can pass at most twice from the special node o * and then it has to meet M : a) Suppose that M is after an agent Z ∈ C X and before an agent W ∈ C Y on the direction that Z is moving (see Figure 7 .2b in the Appendix). Then Z may pass at most once from the special node o * before it meets M . b) Suppose that M is before an agent Z ∈ C X and after an agent W ∈ C Y on the direction that Z is moving (see Figure 7 .2a in the Appendix). Then Z may pass at most twice from the special node o * before it meets M . Hence let A ∈ C X without loss of generality be the first agent which exits the initial state and meets M at a node m, and let B (which should belong to C Y due to the FIFO links) be the first agent which exits the initial state and meets M at a node m ′ . Both agents A and B become stoppers. Then let C be the next agent that exits the initial state and meets A or B. Suppose without loss of generality that C meets A (and therefore C ∈ C X ). Hence C becomes a searcher. All other agents (if any) belonging in C X will gather at node m. A similar situation may appear at node m ′ if there are more agents belonging in C Y (i.e., having the same orientation for the ring as agent B). Nevertheless there will be at most two searchers C, D and they will have different orientation for the ring. All other agents will gather at nodes m and m ′ before the searchers D and C arrive at m and m ′ respectively. If the total number k of the honest agents is odd, then exactly one of the sets C X , C Y has an odd number of agents. Suppose without loss of generality that C X has an odd number of agents. Then at node m exactly one of the agents there, it will be at state stopper while at node m ′ there will be only agents at state final, before the corresponding searcher arrives at each node. Hence only the searcher which reaches m will change its state to collector, will collect all agents and gather with everyone at node m ′ (the other searcher which arrives at m ′ will stay there). In any case above, it is easy to see that each agent may traverse the network at most a constant number of times before rendezvous occurs. Hence the agents meet within O(kn) edge traversals.
Hence by Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 we have:
Theorem 1. In any anonymous and asynchronous ring with a special node o * and one malicious agent, k honest agents having constant memory and no knowledge about their number, can solve the rendezvous problem if and only if k > 2 and either the ring is oriented or k is odd.
IV. RENDEZVOUS IN A MESH NETWORK
We now study the problem in an oriented mesh network. Let us start by giving the following definition. We give below a necessary initial condition for solvable instances which is an immediate consequence of Property 2. 
Lemma 6. Consider an initial configuration of honest agents in a mesh with a malicious agent. If Property 1 does not hold, then for any honest agent
Hence the above necessary condition implies that if Property 2 holds, then the initial configuration H
o of all nodes which are occupied by honest agents is either: 1) connected without holes (i.e., without unoccupied nodes surrounded by occupied nodes) or, 2) connected with holes or, 3) disconnected with any R u (where u is occupied) having at least one more occupied node. We study below whether we can solve the problem for those three categories of initial configurations.
Lemma 7. The rendezvous problem is unsolvable in an oriented mesh with a malicious agent, even for initial configurations for which Property 2 holds.
PROOF Consider an initial configuration consisting of a path of l > 1 nodes and let m be the node where the malicious agent M is placed. Any potentially correct algorithm should move the agents and since the agents are anonymous they should all try to move. If the algorithm moves the agents towards East or W est then consider an horizontal path, otherwise consider a vertical path. In any case all agents try to move along the direction of the path. Hence because of the asynchronicity, an adversary can move only one agent and then Corollary 1 holds.
Notice that Lemma 7 holds for initial configurations of any of the above three categories. Hence, we need to enhance the model in order to get positive results. A natural change would be to give the agents the capability of scanning the adjacent nodes, i.e., decide whether the adjacent nodes are free or occupied. When the agents have a d−visibility we assume that moves are instantaneous, i.e., an agent cannot be traveling along an edge while another agent is scanning its neighbourhood. This is a typical limitation in asynchronous models when the agents scan their neighbourhood 4 . However, as we show below, even when the agents have 1−visibility, the problem remains unsolvable for initial configurations of any of the above three categories.
Definition 2. We say that an agent
Lemma 8.
The rendezvous problem is unsolvable in an oriented mesh with a malicious agent when the agents are capable of scanning their adjacent nodes, even for initial configurations for which Property 2 holds. 4 Notice that without this limitation the problem remains unsolvable even in a path, since any algorithm which moves agents located at internal nodes is clearly wrong and any algorithm which moves an extreme agent will fail because an adversary can arrange the execution delays so that when the extreme agent has started but not completed its move, its adjacent agent scans and decides to move, therefore disconnecting the configuration. PROOF Suppose that a potentially correct algorithm moves an agent with at least two neighbours, based on its view V. It is not difficult to see that there is always another initially connected configuration with an agent with the same view V which will get disconnected if this agent moves. If the algorithm moves only agents with one neighbour then in the configuration depicted in Figure 4 , nobody moves and therefore the problem is unsolvable.
Hence we further equip the agents with the capability of scanning the nodes at distance two. In that case the problem remains unsolvable for initial configurations of the last two categories as defined above, namely for connected configurations with holes or for disconnected configurations for which Property 2 holds. In fact we can demonstrate that the problem remains unsolvable for connected configurations with holes (i.e., unoccupied nodes surrounded by occupied nodes) even when agents have the capability of scanning at any constant distance (see Figure 8 in the Appendix). Similarly the problem is unsolvable for disconnected configurations for which Property 2 holds (see Figure 9 in the Appendix)). Hence it seems that for those configurations the combination of the asynchronicity and the limited view (to any constant fraction of the complete view) makes the problem unsolvable.
However, as we show below, the problem becomes solvable for any initial configuration which is connected without holes. In that case the agents after scanning their close-by nodes within a two-hops distance, they move to occupied nodes in a way that they maintain the connectivity and they do not create holes. In order to describe the algorithm we define the eleven local configurations shown in Figure 5 . In those configurations, empty cycles represent free nodes, while cycles containing black dots represent occupied nodes. The remaining vertices on the figures represent nodes which may be either occupied or free. The agent (let us call it A) which is located below a horizontal arrow in cases (a-g), moves horizontally as depicted by the arrow. The agent (let us call it B) which is located left of a vertical arrow in cases (h-m), moves vertically as depicted by the arrow. Hence the algorithm can be described as follows:
Algorithm RV-MESH: If an agent has a view (within two hops) like the one of agent A or B described before, then this agent moves towards the direction shown by the corresponding arrow. Otherwise the agent does not move. Figure 5 . View of the scanning agent located below (cases a-g) or left to (cases h-m) the arrow. Occupied nodes are white with a smaller black node inside, while free nodes are white. Nodes which are not shown while they are within two hops from the scanning agent, can be either occupied or empty. The scanning agent will move East in cases (a, b), West in cases (c, d, e, f, g), South in case (h), and North in cases (i, l, m).
Nodes which are within two hops from the scanning agent and are not shown in those configurations can be either occupied or empty. If the location of the scanning agent is close to the border of the grid and some of the nodes in those eleven configurations do not exist, then the agent behaves as those nodes existed in its view and were empty. We also notice that if an agent A located at a node u starts executing its cycle 'look-compute-move' then until A moves no other operation can take place at u (i.e., no other agent at u executes its cycle and no other agent can come into u). That is, operations at a node u take place with mutual exclusion 5 .
Lemma 9.
For any connected without holes configuration of at least three occupied nodes, there is at least one agent having as a view one depicted in Figure 5 .
We now prove the following:
Lemma 10. Consider any connected without holes configuration of k agents occupying at least 3 nodes. After any number of moves according to Figure 5 , the resulting configuration is also connected without holes. Furthermore, after at most k edge traversals the number of occupied nodes has strictly decreased.
PROOF Let C be any connected without holes configuration of k agents occupying at least three nodes and let C ′ be a resulting configuration after any number of agents' moves according Algorithm RV-MESH. First observe that since any agent can only move to an adjacent node which was occupied at the moment when the agent looked, this means that no agent will ever move to a node which was not occupied at C. Hence C ′ consists of a subset of occupied nodes of C, and since an agent which has all its neighbours occupied never moves, if C ′ contains holes then it would mean that C also contained holes, which is a contradiction. Now we show that the new configuration C ′ remains connected. Notice that an agent A moves towards North or South only when it is adjacent to only one other occupied node v and moves towards v (see cases (h,i,l,m) of Figure 5 ). Furthermore, the agents at node v cannot move according to any view before A moves. Hence if A moves towards North or South it cannot disconnect the configuration. If an agent A moves towards West (according to cases (e,f,g) of Figure 5 ) or East (according to case (a) of Figure 5 ) then again it cannot disconnect the configuration since A has to move towards its only neighbouring occupied node and agents from that node cannot move according to any view before A moves. For the remaining cases ((b,c,d ) of Finally, we show that a configuration C ′ that has resulted from C after at most k edge traversals has strictly less occupied nodes than C. As proved before, either all colocated agents will move (one by one) according to one of the views of Figure 5 making a new free node which will never be reoccupied or at a block of at least 4 occupied nodes the top agents will swap positions. However, according to the views of Figure 5 , this swapping may happen only once for a fixed block. Hence after at most (k − 1)/2 swaps and one additional move the occupied nodes in C ′ will be strictly less than in C.
We also need the following lemma.
Lemma 11. Consider a connected configuration of k agents in two occupied nodes. After at most k + 1 edge traversals according to the Figure 5 , there is only one occupied node. In view of Lemmas 10 and 11, and because of the fact that in a sequence of configurations starting at any initially connected configuration without holes of at least three occupied nodes, there are at most (k − 1)/2 pairs of consecutive configurations where the number of occupied nodes remained the same (see the proof of Lemma 10) it is not difficult to see that Algorithm RV-MESH leads k agents to rendezvous after O(knm) edge traversals.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied deterministic protocols for the Rendezvous problem of honest agents in asynchronous networks with a malicious agent which can move at any speed in the network and can prevent the agents of reaching any node it occupies. We presented a universal algorithm for ring topologies which gathers the agents within O(kn) edge traversals for any feasible initial configuration. We also presented a deterministic protocol for oriented n × m grids which leads the agents to rendezvous within O(knm) edge traversals for any feasible initial configuration. An interesting open question is whether the problem can be solved in unoriented grids for connected configurations without holes when the agents are capable of scanning within a constant distance (more than one). It would be interesting to study randomized protocols for some of the unsolvable cases, and also to study this problem in synchronous networks. Finally, for solvable cases it would be interesting to see if the problem remains solvable for more severe behaviour of the malicious agent.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 9: Select the column with at least one occupied node which is closer to the left (West) border of the mesh. From that column select the upper (North-West) occupied node u. Hence the two nodes West and North of u are free. Since the configuration is connected, at least one of the nodes East (say w) or South (say v) of u, is occupied. If only w is occupied then the agents at u have the view of Figure 5 (a) and move towards East. If only v is occupied then the agents at u have the view of Figure 5 (h) and move towards South. If both w, v are occupied then if the node which is East of v and South of w (say z) is occupied, the agents at u have the view of Figure 5 (b) and move towards East. If however, node z is free, then the agents at u do not move. In this last case, since the configuration is connected and without cycles that contain unoccupied nodes, it is composed of the following two 'generalised' trees: One tree starts with edge (u, v) and the other starts with edge (u, w). Each occupied node of the configuration different from u, appears in exactly one of those two trees (otherwise there would be a cycle of occupied nodes containing node z). We call these trees 'generalised' because some parts of the trees could be 'thick' (i.e., composed of more than one row or column of occupied nodes). Notice that there should be a frontier of free nodes which extends from node z to either the East or the South border of the mesh, which prevents any two occupied nodes belonging to different trees, from being connected through any path of occupied nodes that is not passing from node u (since if such a path exists for two nodes, then the free node z would be contained in a cycle of occupied nodes). We can now show that at least one agent on some branch of a tree will move according to one of the views of Figure 5 . In fact we prove that the branches of the tree (which extend East, West, North or South) shrink starting from their ends. First it is easy to see that for occupied nodes which are connected only to their East or to their South, the agents there, have views of Figure 5 (a) and (h) respectively, and they will move accordingly. For occupied nodes which are connected only to their West or to their North, the agents there, have views of Figure 5 (e,f,g) and (i,l,m) respectively, and they will move accordingly. For branches with blocks of at least 4 occupied nodes: 1) If the branch extends to the West then its upper leftmost occupied node x is connected only to its East and South, the agents at x have the view of Figure 5 (b) and they move towards East. After repeating such moves and some others based on the view of Figure 5 (a), the branch will be eliminated. 2) If the branch extends to the North then its upper leftmost occupied node x is connected only to its East and South, the agents at x have the view of Figure 5 (b) and they move towards East. After repeating such moves and some others based on the view of Figure 5 (h) and maybe some moves based on the views of Figure 5 (c,d), the branch will be eliminated. 3) If the branch extends to the East then its upper rightmost occupied node y is connected only to its West and South, the agents at y have the view of Figure 5 (c,d) and they move towards West. After repeating such moves and some others based on the view of Figure 5 (e,f,g), the branch will be eliminated. 4) If the branch extends to the South then:
• if its upper leftmost occupied node x is connected only to its East and South or its upper rightmost occupied node y is connected only to its West and South, the agents at x or y can repeatedly move based on the views of Figure 5 (b,a,i,l), or (c,d,e,f,g) respectively, and the branch will be eliminated.
• if both its upper leftmost occupied node x is connected to its West or North and its upper rightmost occupied node y is connected to its East and North then in at least one of those nodes x, y those extra branches can be eliminated as above so that case 3 above will hold. Even if the agents are capable of scanning at any constant distance, this 'polygonal' configuration can always be expanded so that all the agents with the same number have exactly the same view and therefore at least two of them should move. However, after such a move Corollary 1 holds and the problem is unsolvable.
Proof of Lemma 11:
If the occupied nodes are in a row, then it may happen that two agents move based on views (not perceived from the same configuration) of Figure 5 (a and e), swapping places. However, then only the agents on the West will move according to view of the Figure 5(a) , and they all gather at one node.
If the occupied nodes are in a column, then it may happen that two agents move based on views (not perceived from the same configuration) of Figure 5 (h and i), swapping places. However, then only the agents on the North will move according to view of the Figure 5 (h), and they all gather at one node. M Figure 9 . An initially disconnected configuration of agents for which Property 2 holds. The malicious agent has been placed as depicted. If any agent moves then Corollary 1 holds and the problem is unsolvable.
